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POLITICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN 
HEGEL’S «PHENOMENOLOGY»
J.N. Shklar, Freedom and Independence: a 
Study of the Political Ideas in Hegel’s 
nPhenomenology of Mind», Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. XV, 216.
by
Pericles S. Vallianos 
Department of Philosophy 
Brandeis University, USA
Professor Shklar’s book on the 
Phenomenology of Spirit* has performed a 
valuable service. It has systematically 
brought out the core of the political ideas in 
Hegel’s massive masterpiece. And it has 
done so with vigour and eloquence. The 
PhG has long been considered as a 
«non-political» work and, as a result, what 
Freedom and Independence is attempting 
has been consistently neglected in the litera­
ture dealing with Hegel’s political thought.
In his PhG Hegel tried to reconstruct the 
journey of consciousness from a naive, 
natural level of primitive intellectual cer­
tainty through the senses and their im­
mediate objects towards a perfectly ade­
quate («absolute») understanding of the 
meaning of the entire human experience. 
This ex post ordering of history’s raw mater­
ial, which claimed to find a dynamic neces­
sity in our cultural past, unifying it as a tele­
ological design in terms of lower and higher 
levels of philosophic comprehension, or­
dered to the final abolition of any division 
between subject and object, man and his 
world, did not intend to leave outside its 
grasp any field of the human endeavour. Ac­
cordingly, the political forms generated in 
history also came into purview.
For Prof. Shklar, the fundamental politi­
cal achievement of mankind, as Hegel saw 
it, had been the ancient Greek city-state,
♦Hereafter referred to as PhG from the German 
Phénoménologie des Geistes.
whose flower of perfection was Periclean 
Athens. The polis was a harmonious total­
ity, in which the private interests of its citi­
zens were intimately fused with the pur­
poses of the whole, in an ethos of ex­
troverted worldliness placing the highest 
premium on collective culture, i.e. on the 
unifying customs unconsciously transmitted 
through the generations. The individual 
Athenian could never have conceived him­
self in conflict with the demands of a public 
authority legitimated by traditional law and 
religion. The private sphere never crystal­
lised into a petty realm of egotistic concern 
strictly delimited against the polity. The par­
ticular subject lived in and by the whole, and 
the whole allowed scope for the most splen­
did fruition of individual genius as servitor 
and carrier of the popular civilisation.
This bright universe, in which private man 
found himself in a humanised nature and felt 
at home in a political order he experienced 
as the product of the activities of each and all 
through the ages, was not, nevertheless, de­
stined to be, qua objective order, an eternal 
conquest and terminus of humanity’s as­
cent. The Greek world carried within itself 
the seeds of its own disintegration.
The fusion of the universal and the par­
ticular realised in Athens was not, to Hegel’s 
mind, based on rational self-awareness. The 
citizen adhered to the polity in a spontane­
ous, instinctive way. He was socialised in 
the medium of age-old traditions that were 
simply taken for granted, affectively af­
firmed, but in no way tested against a stan­
dard of thought external to them. No reflec­
tive distance between an independent ra­
tional subjectivity and the collective uncon­
scious was allowed in the Polis. Freedom to 
the Greeks was. immediate belonging to a 
universal, transindividual substance. The 
essence of their culture was an aesthetic ap­
preciation of this spontaneous unity with 
their natural and social environment, a 
«religion of beauty».
Consequently, the death-knell of the Polis 
was sounded at the moment when the inde­
pendence of the subject, as the carrier of a
rational principle in itself, began to assert 
itself against the traditional conception of 
freedom, the immediate identification of the 
private and public spheres. This process 
found its world-historical symbol in the per­
son of Socrates. He was the first to reject 
unquestioning assent to the conventional 
wisdom of the πολλοί, and stress the pri­
macy of the rational rules resident in the 
spirit of the Wise subject. Thus, he under­
mined the foundations of his custom-based 
community. The Polis put Socrates to death, 
yet the irruption of rationalistic indi­
vidualism into the closed «ethical 
substance» signalled the beginning of the 
downfall of that spontaneously harmonic to­
getherness.
The necessary demise of Greece brought 
about the eclipse of the public ethos. The 
private realm consolidated its autonomy. 
The individual became absorbed in his self- 
seeking pursuits. Society was gradually 
transformed into an aggregation, a «dust» 
composed of narrow, egotistic bourgeois. 
The substantial majesty of the public whole 
lost its immediate touch with the citizen, to 
become a vacuous, hostile beyond. And a 
whole array of ideologies of introspection, 
or, to use J. Hippolyte’s phrase «strategies 
of retreat» arose to rationalise existence in 
an alienated universe. The Roman Empire, 
based on the principle of the atomic property 
owner enshrined in Roman law, with its 
dominant ideologies of Stoicism and Scepti­
cism; the feudal states, based on a struggle 
between private wealth and public service; 
pre-revolutionary France, in which the 
money power of the rising bougeoisie has 
already corrupted the feudal institutions, 
and reason has undercut the claims of a 
transcendent faith; finally, the world of the 
French Revolution itself, in which the radi­
cal independence of the isolated subject runs 
riot, to put an end to all semblance of self- 
subsistent rationality in the feudal order, 
without, however, being able to erect a new 
totalising political framework; all these 
forms of social and intellectual diremption 
are necessary derivatives from that fateful 
occurrence, the dissolution of the spontane­
ous, natural integrity of the Greeks.
Hegel looks back on Athens with pro­
found nostalgia. He shares the admiration 
for the Hellenic spirit that captivated the 
German intellectuals of his generation. The 
Greeks enjoyed a cheerful happiness, an ef­
fortless harmony in representation and feel­
ing that had been forever lost by a mankind 
fallen prey to fragmentation (the public vs. 
the private realm; the «here and now» vs. 
the beyond).
Hegel knows how to delineate with 
breathtaking strokes the wide strides of cold 
necessity in the downfall of humanity’s 
sunny youth. But he is not merely the 
rationaliser ex post. He is also a master in 
penetrating his subject-matter, exposing the 
salient features of its dynamic, following the 
pulsating flow of its being, living along 
within it. His feeling and passion are thus 
brought into full play. The vibrantly poetic
181
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 02:43:25 |
Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικών 1Ερευνών, α' τετράμηνο 1977
images describing the irreversible in the de­
cline of Hellas testify to this1. Hegel is 
equally mourning over the loss of the mo­
ment of pristine integrity, and the sorry 
spectacle of the unhappy man of his own age 
serves to redouble his sublime, dignified 
sense of loss.
Prof. Shklar is eager to point out that 
Hegel is not in this connection intending his 
image of Greece as a «utopia», a scheme 
slated for imminent realisation. In 1806, at 
the time Hegel was writingthefViG, he is not 
any more proposing a resurrection of anti­
que «virtue» as the remedy for post­
revolutionary alienation. History is an inex­
orable movement forward. Athens is an 
ideal only in the general sense that it repres­
ents a desirable fusion of the universal and 
the particular, albeit it achieved a finite, 
natural form thereof; this unity is to be re­
conquered, but at the highest summit of 
self-conscious reason, integrating the mo­
ment of reflection that Hellas lacked.
Coupled with this, the Hegel of 1806does 
not perceive any actual political form that 
could pretend to answer the yarning for 
reunification, which the Revolution exacer­
bated to the most extreme peaks of anguish. 
And yet, as Shklar rightly insists, the hope 
for recovery cannot be abandoned. If it 
were, then man’s journey would have 
reached its end in a fit of nihilistic self- 
deprecation. The problem is that Hegel is 
here unable to offer theoretical guidelines 
for an institutional arrangement conducive 
to the realisation of that hope.
It is only in this precise sense that the PhG 
can be considered a non-political, more ac­
curately a non-statist work, as F. Rosenz- 
weig has argued in his classic Hegel und der 
Staat: its examination of con temporary real­
ity reveals a thorough liquidation of political 
substantiality with no signs of regeneration. 
Hence Hegel’s glance remains riveted to our 
Hellenic past, recollecting a bitter process of 
political dissolution, to which no actual or 
theoretical state can be administered as an 
antidote. The PhG is an «elegy for Hellas», 
whose loss is an everpresent wound in the 
spirit.
This is, in principle, Prof. Shklar’s recon­
struction of the political movement in the 
PhG. It is a valuable achievement filling a 
noticeable gap. In the process of articulating 
the «elegiac» interpretation she has also 
managed to shed new light on some riddles 
that have long divided students of Hegel.
Her discussion, for example, of the fam­
ous «master and slave» dialectic clearly 
stresses the dimension of a self-diremption 
internal to the Ego, the absolute prius and 
locus of all dialectical development in the 
tradition of idealism, as the root cause for 
the conflict. This cautions against an over­
simplifying, crudely sociological 
(«marxist») analysis alleging that Hegel 
somehow possessed a «presentiment» of the 
«truth» that class-struggle is the foundation 
of the human collectivity.
1. cf. PhG, Baitlie translation, pp. 753*754.
Even more illuminating is, further, 
Shklar’s discussion of the aenigmatic chap­
ter in the PhG entitled: «Self-conscious In­
dividuals as a Community of Animals».2
This is a section that has occasioned the 
most contradictory commentary. For J. 
Hippolyte, for example, it depicts the world 
of the isolated, egocentric bourgeois intel­
lectual of the postrevolutionary era with its 
cult of the romantic genius pursuing his art 
for its own sake and ultimately disintegrat­
ing into empty haughtiness and outright 
deception.3 For G. Lukacs, on the other 
hand, here we have a stunningly accurate 
description of the social reality of early 
capitalism, with its mass of independent 
small producers meeting at the marketplace 
for the purpose of exchange in a process of 
economic interdependence.4 Shklar quite 
adroitly establishes that the Sache selbst, 
the real fact, the objective cause, for which 
the self-subsistent individuality, whose only 
value is self-expression, pretends to be sac­
rificing itself, is encompassing enough to 
function as the abstract expression of mater­
ial as well as mental labour. This is a signifi­
cant contribution to the analysis of this 
especially abstract passage in Hegel, the ex­
treme ambiguity of which did not deter the 
various commentators from putting forth 
their views as self-evident truth.
I wish to supplement this presentation of 
Freedom and Independence with a few criti­
cal reflections, which, however, do not in 
any way detract from its outstanding ac­
complishments. Prof. Shklar herself con­
ceded in the Preface to her book that she was 
attempting an interpretation of only one part 
of one work in the Hegelian corpus. From 
this the question immediately arises as to the 
connection of the political moment, which 
she chooses to explore, to the overall 
metaphysical framework of the PhG, and 
beyond that to the Hegelian vision as a com­
pleted system, to which, as we know, the 
PhG was meant as an «Introduction». 
Shklar does provide an overview of the 
complete argument in the PhG, in which the 
supra-social teleology of absolute know­
ledge shaping the design is emphasised. In 
the relevant chapter («A Topography of the 
Phenomenology») the political concern is in­
tegrated into the overarching intent of ulti­
mate subject-object fusion. But when the 
spotlight shifts to matters more narrowly 
political the embededness is in danger of 
being neglected.
Any tearing away of the political element 
from its metaphysical environment has sig­
nificant consequences. There is no question 
but that if we restrict our gaze to the political 
movement [Polis (unity) -> post-Greek di­
vision (unhappy consciousness) -> 
atomised present, unstructured social 
chaos] then the prevailing disposition is 
elegiac. Hegel is here rationalising the col-
2. PhG. Baillie translation, pp. 419-438.
3. cf. J. Hippolyte, Genese et structure de la 
phénoménologie. Paris. 1946. pp. 286-308.
4. cf. G. Lukacs, Der junge Hegel. Berlin 1967, pp. 
589-590.
lapse of Hellenic integrity, under conditions 
of contemporary alienation. This hopeless­
ness of the present intensifies the nostalgic, 
Hellenocentric mood.
And yet, if, going beyond politics, we 
consider the PhG as a coherent metaphysi­
cal statement about the character and poten­
tialities of the human knowing faculty, as a 
process of appropriating the revealed abso­
lute in thought, from the initial overcoming 
of raw externality, as consciousness discov­
ers the emptiness of its supposedly richest 
reservoir of knowledge in the objects of 
sense, on to the final exaltation of the power 
of reason to leap beyond vanquished objec­
tivity, which has now been tamed for good 
within the confines of a universal synthetic 
scheme, and render perfectly transparent 
the inner structure of the cosmos, then we 
realise that the backward-looking recollect­
ing mood, that the political sphere exudes, is 
merely one moment in a more general thrust, 
which is indeed anticipatory, albeit drawn 
from epistemological and not political 
sources.In the Preface to the PhG Hegel expressly 
announced that he viewed his epoch as «a 
birth-time and a period of transition». He 
envisioned a «new world» dawning upon the 
human spirit, an era that would break with 
the divisive habits of thought bred by the 
«culture of reflection», in order to produce a 
new body of knowledge based upon the re­
conciling principles of the absolute 
philosophy, already in 1806 announcing a 
new vision of the όντως öv as self-moved 
subject.
This dawning of a new age is, hence, nota 
political but a philosophical image, one that 
was repeatedly made use of by Hegel in the 
late works as well, where its affinity with the 
final systematisation of the absolute he 
thought he had achieved is quite explicit.5 
The French Revolution has totally disor­
ganised the social substratum. The outward 
push of consciousness to remodel external­
ity according to the rational principle of the 
18 th c. («utility») has not gone beyond reck­
less fury and mindless destruction 
(«terror»). It cannot engender the new sub­
stantialities needed for reintegration. In the 
midst of the ruins consciousness takes a 
flight beyond political engagement, retreat­
ing into its inner sanctuary. There it discov­
ers the spark of moral reason. And from this 
the moral Welf-anschauung, the sublime en­
vironment of Kantian self-legislating sub­
jects emerges. This transition signifies the 
migration of the «world-spirit» to a «new 
land», the land of its final and highest fulfill­
ment, the land of philosophical contempla­
tion, subjectivity and the truth of idealism. 
This is the land called Germany in worldly 
terms.
Hegel believed that the rise of German 
idealism signalled the final stage in the 
spirit’s ascent to absolute knowledge. The 
architect of this revolutionary movement 
was the great Kant. Hegel, of course, did not
5. cf. Preface to first Edition of the Encyclopedia, Leipzig 
1920, p. 4.
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accept the principles and conclusions of the 
Kantian teaching. The PhG teems with 
slashing attacks against its hopelessly analy­
tic spirit. But in any case Hegel recognised 
that Kant, despite the fact that he made it ex 
hypothesi impossible to carry out the project 
of subject-object unification, did, neverthe­
less, posit it as an inescapable yearning of 
pure reason, an «endless task» necessarily 
engendered in the course of analysing the 
dynamics of the «transcendental unity» of 
the Ego.
Kant stubbornly based his revolutionary 
conception on '-a strictly subjective basis, 
severing «our» (limited) understanding from 
the objective laws governing the universe 
«in itself». Hegel saw it as his vocation to 
suppress this spurious separation, to reunite 
consciousness and its object in a system of 
integral reason, which is not an impossible 
Ought but a tangible spiritual reality acces­
sible to the individual by means of adequate 
philosophical instruction.
The PhG is precisely such a paedagogy, 
an attempt to reorient the average human 
being away from the abstract analytical 
principles of formal logic that have up to 
now shaped his mode of thought towards a 
higher intellectual existence: he' is encour­
aged to burst the dams of tautology in order 
to inundate the in itself, and to receive, in 
turn, the full richness of a rationalised cos­
mos in his soul. This is a περιαγωγή ψυχής in 
the most eminent Platonic sense. This is the 
supreme goal that the PhG announces, a 
goal going far beyond the limited aspiration 
to a rational political order. Its essence is 
thoroughly gnoseological, the outcome of an 
immanent criticism of the transcendental 
principles of Kant, a spiritual consummation 
internal to the German idealist mind.
The driving anticipation of such a com­
pleted svstem of reason is the key emotion 
permeating the PhG, and it finds its highest 
expression in that passionate masterpiece, 
its Preface, a text that is markedly de- 
emphasised in Freedom and Independence. 
The young philosopher is greatly excited for 
having discovered the absolute rules, which 
will now inevitably, as he sees it, push man 
along to a perfect understanding of his exis­
tence in a transparent universe. The elegy 
for the lost harmony of Hellas has thus been 
overcome by a doxology to dialectical 
reason conquering the elusive absolute on 
the basis of the rule of synopticity, which 
again was first enunciated by Plato. The pas­
sionate images of the Preface, as well as the 
rapturous concluding lines of the PhG, 
create the emotional atmosphere for that 
leap of human subjectivity into the infinity of 
the cosmic One. The elegy to the Hellenic 
past is aufgehoben, in the strictest Hegelian 
sense, by the fervent paean to the German- 
Hegelian future.
Hegel’s political insights must be firmly 
placed within this metaphysical scheme. 
Only thus can we effectively combat an 
ever-present temptation to elevate the polit­
ical moment to supreme dominance in the 
system. Prof. Shklar’s preoccupation with
the politics of the PhG may have made a bias 
in this direction unavoidable, as evidenced 
by her unquestioned readiness to identify 
Hegel’s «Volksgeist» with Montesquieu’s 
«esprit des lois» with its predominantly ob­
jective, political flavour. But Hegel’s politi­
cal concepts, even his powerful state as con­
structed in the Philosophy of Right of 1820, 
participate in a higher metaphysical move­
ment, whose telos is not the self-subsistent 
perfection of a rational political community, 
but a spiritual world of cosmic reconciliation 
based on the healing principles of absolute 
reason.
A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES
I am most gratified by the review of my 
book A dictionary of the social 
sciences published by Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd and I appreciate being given 
the hospitality of your columns for answer­
ing the two major objections raised by Helen 
Papachristou.
The first objection is that 1 omitted a few 
but important terms such as «capitalism», 
«socialism», «liberalism», «Marxism».
I was forced to establish criteria for the 
inclusion and exclusion of terms. As the so­
cial sciences have survived the Wittgenstei- 
nian onslaught of P.G. Winch (1958), the 
Positivismusstreit of the 1960’s, and re­
peated attacks on their scientificity, it is im­
portant to try to establish law-like generali­
zations which employ terms which are 
rigorously defined. It was clear that the 
terms enumerated were too vague for this 
purpose and they were therefore rejected. 
The term «Marxism» was rejected because 
Marxism is a Weltanschauung and is 
broader than sociology.
The second objection is that certain writ­
ers who should have been attributed to cer­
tain definitions were omitted.
These omissions were deliberate and 
there were good reasons for them. Where a 
term or a concept was in common use and 
was used by many leading writers, it was 
considered misleading to mention the classic 
author. In many cases a semantic shift had 
occurred since the term’s introduction. 
Many forms of alienation have been disting­
uished since Karl Marx’s use of the term, for 
example, by C. Wright Mills. G. Lukacs 
used the term «reification» not in the sense 
used by Bidney and by many philosophers of 
science, but in the sense of false 
consciousness. The te m «imitation» is in 
wide use by psychologists and I did not wish 
to associate it with Tarde’s theory of imita­
tion. A lot of work has peen done since the 
time of Adorno, by Eysenck amongst 
others, on the authoritarian personality and 
various types of authoritarian personality 
have been distinguished.
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